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Abstract: Rawlsian political liberalism famously requires a prohibition on truth. 
This has led to the charge that liberalism embraces non-cognitivism, according 
to which political claims have the moral status of emotions or expressions of 
preference. This result would render liberalism a non-starter for liberatory 
politics, a conclusion that political liberals themselves disavow. This conflict 
between what liberalism claims and what liberalism does has led critics to 
charge that the theory is disingenuous and functions as political ideology. In 
this paper, I explore one way that this charge unfolds: critics charge that 
liberalism utilizes an individualistic and identity-insensitive social ontology, 
which in turn yields epistemic deficiencies that render it incapable of detecting 
oppression. The theory’s claim to freestandingness then shields it from 
necessary critique. I argue that this objection relies on constructing a conflict 
between liberalism’s professed non-cognitivism and its actual cognitivist 
commitments. By demonstrating that Rawlsian political liberalism explicitly 
endorses substantive moral truths, and that the method of avoidance applies 
only to public justification for coercive state action, I show that the theory is 
openly and foundationally cognitivist, and thus that the charge of 
disingenuousness does not stick. 
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1. Introduction 
In a time of post-truth politics, “alternative facts,” and strategic claims that “truth 
is relative,” it might seem that democratic citizens desperately need to embrace 
the truth.1 Indeed, defending a theory that prohibits appeals to truth in politics 
may seem backwards or misguided; yet Rawlsian political liberalism famously 
requires such a prohibition. This has led sympathetic commentators to update or 
amend Rawls’s argument to make room for truth within political liberalism 
(Estlund 1998, 2012; Larmore 1999; Cohen 2009), while less sympathetic 
                                                        
1 “Alternative Facts” is a phrase first used by Kellyanne Conway in an interview with NBC’s 
Meet the Press on January 22, 2017: https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-
press/video/conway-press-secretary-gave-alternative-facts-860142147643; Rudy Giuliani 
argues that “truth is relative” and that “They [special counsel Robert Mueller’s office] may 
have a very different version of the truth than we [members of the Trump Administration] do” 
in an interview with the Washington Post on May 23, 2018: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-reversal-giuliani-now-says-trump-should-do-
interview-with-mueller-team/2018/05/23/82f8fa24-5eb8-11e8-9ee3-
49d6d4814c4c_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ce1fe5862b67. 
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commentators have argued against Rawls’s epistemic abstinence (Raz 1990), 
often charging that his method of avoidance reveals a commitment to political 
non-cognitivism. According to the non-cognitivist interpretation, avoiding truth-
talk about democratic essentials requires denying the truth-aptness of political 
claims; if Rawls is indeed a truth-denialist in this way, political claims, rather 
than being either true or false, would have the moral status of emotions or 
expressions of preference. From here it is a quick step to the conclusion that 
political liberalism requires either skepticism or relativism, according to which 
one view of justice can never be any better, or any worse, than the next.2 
This is a troubling conclusion for several reasons. First, when we make 
political claims or form political beliefs, we tend to think that we are saying or 
believing something true. If political liberals really require that, as citizens, we 
should avoid the truth, what does this mean about the claims and beliefs that we 
standardly take to be true (or at the very least truth-apt)? Second, don’t we want 
our political theory to be able to accommodate our intuition that some claims or 
beliefs about justice are better than others? Isn’t a roughly egalitarian theory of 
distributive justice better than one based on natural hierarchies? Isn’t working 
to eradicate structural oppression better than accepting the status quo? Truth 
denialists cannot make comparative evaluative assessments like these, though 
surely the ability to do so is a desideratum for any adequate political theory. 
These outcomes of a non-cognitivist reading of Rawls have been discussed by 
both critics and defenders of political liberalism.3 
What is less discussed is the impact of Rawls’s method of avoidance on 
political liberalism’s liberatory aims. My goal in this paper is to address political 
liberalism’s fraught relationship with truth with a particular focus on defending 
political liberalism against the charge of disingenuousness that arises when one 
views Rawls as a truth-avoider4. After all, Rawls appears to make all sorts of 
truth-apt claims about justice – claims that he, presumably, believes to be true. 
Do liberals exempt themselves from their very own standards for political 
argumentation? I argue to the contrary that Rawls is not a full-blown truth-
avoider – he does not avoid the truth when discussing the moral basis of 
liberalism, itself (Larmore 1999). Rawls does argue, though, that we should 
avoid comprehensive truth claims when discussing constitutional essentials in 
                                                        
2 For discussion of skeptical or relativistic interpretations of Rawlsian justification, see Barry 
1995, Wall 1998, McCabe 2000, Scanlon 2003.  
3 In addition to the sources already cited, see Hampton 1989; Habermas 1995; Rawls 1995; 
Wenar 1995; Landemore 2017. 
4 The charge of disingenuousness is sometimes leveled by religious critics, who argue that 
political liberalism unjustly excludes religious reasons from the realm of public reason (see 
especially Eberle 2002). This objection is often called the asymmetry objection. I refer to the 
objection central to this paper as the disingenuousness objection, rather than a version of the 
asymmetry objection, because I want to distinguish the sources of this objection from the 
religious critics who are the source of the asymmetry objection. 
Is Liberalism Disingenuous? Truth and Lies in Political Liberalism 
115 
the public sphere. In this limited sense, Rawls does avoid the truth, and on this 
point I argue that political liberals should agree. 
The paper proceeds as follows: after a brief explanation in Section 2 of 
Rawls’s method of avoidance, including his apparent prohibition on truth, I 
explain in Section 3 the practical payoff of such a view for the liberatory 
potential of a political theory. If it is the case that political claims can be neither 
true nor false, then important political debates devolve into battles of personal 
opinion with no correct answers about justice and injustice. However, since 
political liberals, themselves, endorse as true many claims about justice, critical 
commentators charge that political liberalism is a disingenuous theory that 
functions as ideology. In Section 4, I explicate one way in which the 
disingenuousness critique unfolds. Critics charge that liberalism utilizes a social 
ontology that is individualistic and identity-insensitive, which in turn yields 
epistemic deficiencies that render the theory incapable of detecting oppression. 
The social ontology and epistemic results are both illicit, since political 
liberalism claims to be freestanding. The claim to freestandingness, in turn, 
shields liberalism from critique and allows it to function ideologically. In Section 
5, I defend political liberalism against the charge of non-cognitivism that begets 
the disingenuousness critique by demonstrating that liberalism is grounded in 
substantive normative truths, including truths about the nature of citizens and 
citizenship. Liberalism’s truth-avoidance only applies at the level of public 
justification for coercive state action and not to liberalism, itself. Sections 6 and 7 
consider objections and Section 8 concludes. 
2. Rawls on Truth 
According to Rawls, a political conception of justice “does not … use (or deny) 
the concept of truth; nor does it question that concept … Rather, within itself the 
political conception does without the concept of truth” (Rawls 2005, 94). Rawls’s 
view on truth in politics is motivated by the fact of reasonable pluralism – the 
idea that under conditions of freedom like those that ideally exist in democracies, 
people will come to hold different sorts of comprehensive worldviews (e.g. 
Rawls 2005, 54-58). In order to meet the liberal requirement that we respect all 
citizens as free and equal, a conception of justice must not be grounded in a 
single comprehensive doctrine. This is because political liberalism is centrally 
concerned with the question of justification: when is the coercive use of state 
power consistent with the freedom and equality of all citizens? If our conception 
of justice were grounded in one particular moral doctrine, citizens who held 
competing moral views could not recognize our offered reasons as justificatory 
reasons. State action justified by such reasons, then, would violate the liberal 
principle of legitimacy since it would coerce a group of citizens without 
justification that they could recognize as such. This violation of the liberal 
principle of legitimacy would render our conception of justice unjust (Rawls 
2005, 37).  
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Avoiding this injustice is why Rawls urges that our conception of justice 
must be freestanding – it must require no specific moral, metaphysical, or 
epistemological foundation (Rawls 2005, 12). To preserve this freestandingness, 
citizens must avoid appealing to the truth of their comprehensive doctrines 
when debating with their fellow citizens matters of basic justice and 
constitutional essentials; this is a central requirement of public reason. Indeed, 
citizens who cite the truth of their own comprehensive doctrine as a justifying 
reason are unreasonable, since they display a willingness to coerce their fellow 
citizens on terms they could not accept.5 Unreasonable citizens would violate the 
spirit of toleration at the core of political liberalism, according to which citizens 
are free to pursue their idea of the good life without oppressive state 
interference.  
Although disagreement is bound to arise in a free society, Rawls wants our 
political conception of justice to be agreed upon by an overlapping consensus of 
reasonable citizens. But how can we achieve an overlapping consensus in a 
society marked by pluralism? Part of Rawls’s answer involves the avoidance of 
truth. He argues, “Holding a political conception as true, and for that reason 
alone the one suitable basis of public reason, is exclusive, even sectarian, and so 
likely to foster political division” (Rawls 2005, 129). To avoid political division, 
which would potentially jeopardize an overlapping consensus, citizens should 
avoid offering justifying reasons that appeal to the truth, either of their own 
comprehensive doctrines or of the political conception of justice that they favor. 
In this way, we can hope to avoid a society “divided into contending doctrinal 
confessions and hostile social classes” (Rawls 1999a, 475). Given the fact of this 
pluralism and the divisions it creates, legitimacy demands truth-avoidance. 
3. Boo to Oppression! 
Political liberalism’s truth-avoidance raises the specter of political non-
cognitivism, or truth denial. According to non-cognitivists, moral judgments do 
not express beliefs about the world; for emotivist A.J. Ayer, for example, moral 
judgments merely express emotions of approval or disapproval and as such can 
be neither true nor false (Ayer 1952). Similarly, political non-cognitivists 
maintain that political judgments have no truth value; they are simply not the 
kinds of things that can be either true or false. Thus, political non-cognitivists 
also eliminate an objective standard by which to judge our political claims. Like 
in Ayer’s emotivism, claims made within democratic politics amount to mere 
expressions of personal approval or disapproval. For the non-cognitivist, when 
we make political claims about equality and justice, we are merely expressing 
feelings like “Yay for equality!” and “Boo to injustice!”  
                                                        
5 Note that Larmore’s political liberalism utilizes a different conception of reasonableness 
(Larmore 1999). 
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Since Rawls argues that his political conception of justice does without the 
truth it is understandable why some commentators have interpreted his view as 
non-cognitivist. Habermas, for example, wonders whether Rawls is reduced to 
value-skepticism, according to which “behind the validity claim of normative 
statements there lurks something purely subjective: feelings, wishes, or 
decisions expressed in a grammatically misleading fashion” (Habermas 1995, 
123). Although he recognizes that Rawls himself wants to avoid this conclusion, 
Habermas questions his success: “Rawls must be understood to mean that … the 
procedure of the public use of reason remains the final court of appeal for 
normative statements” (Habermas 1995, 124). Indeed, Rawls contrasts his own 
political constructivism with moral realism, claiming that reasonableness, not 
truth, is the standard of correctness for a political conception of justice. 
In Section 5 I will argue that Rawlsian political liberalism is not non-
cognitivist. The purposes of the current section are to understand the charge of 
non-cognitivism and to outline the consequence that follows from this 
interpretation: if political liberalism is indeed committed to the view that 
political judgments are not truth-apt, then it is a non-starter as a liberatory view. 
Consider a basic example involving two competing normative claims: “Access to 
affordable birth control is mandated by justice,” and “Access to affordable birth 
control is not mandated by justice.” An adequate political theory must be able to 
diagnose and address inequalities like a lack of equal access to safe and 
affordable birth control. Ostensibly, the tasks of diagnosing and addressing 
inequalities must rely on the acceptance of certain claims as true, in this case, 
that access to affordable birth control is mandated by justice, and that a lack of 
access contributes to the structural oppression of women. Feminists must be 
able to state these political claims as true in public deliberation, and lawmakers 
must rely on these political claims as true in order to amend legislation.  
But a political non-cognitivist holds that political claims are neither true 
nor false. This means that stating “Access to affordable birth control is mandated 
by justice” amounts to claiming “I really like affordable birth control,” or worse 
yet, “Yay to affordable birth control!” Moreover, these statements of personal 
preference carry the same weight as the opposing claim “Affordable birth control 
is not mandated by justice,” or “Boo to affordable birth control!” Debate about 
this important issue becomes a matter of competing personal perspectives, in 
which case “Boo to oppression!” is all a non-cognitivist liberalism can say about 
injustice. 
4. Is Liberalism Disingenuous? 
But of course, political liberalism does much more than merely emote about 
oppression. Rawls himself has plenty to say on the topic; indeed, Rawls’s political 
turn is motivated by the idea that free and equal citizens should be free from 
oppressive state intervention. Further, feminist liberals argue that political 
liberalism can yield substantive feminist outcomes (Hartley and Watson 2010), 
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and critical race scholars like Tommie Shelby maintain that liberalism has the 
tools necessary to combat racial oppression (Shelby 2016). But how is this 
possible? How can political liberalism claim to be truth-avoiding while at the 
same time embracing normative truths, which as we’ve seen, seem to be 
required for liberatory political goals? This apparent puzzle has led some critical 
commentators to the conclusion that liberalism is disingenuous; liberal theorists 
claim to abide by one set of norms while illicitly relying on opposing ones6. At 
times, Rawls appears to make himself vulnerable to this charge. Recall Rawls’s 
claim that a political conception of justice “does not … use (or deny) the concept 
of truth.” How is that truth-avoidance supposed to align with the argument that 
“There are facts about justice that may be discovered” (Rawls 2005, 125)? Here 
Rawls seems to be appealing to normative facts, the very sorts of things that a 
non-cognitivist Rawls would disavow.  
The charge of disingenuousness thus amounts to the charge that political 
liberalism violates its own truth-avoidance. One way for this sweeping objection 
to proceed is by illustrating that liberalism illicitly relies on a problematic social 
ontology, which in turn yields ideological epistemic blind spots.7 This marks 
liberalism as disingenuous since its truth-avoidance and freestandingness 
require that it not rest on or assert as true any specific moral, metaphysical, or 
epistemological view. In other words, political liberalism claims to be 
epistemically abstinent when in fact its ontological assumptions cause an 
inability to detect oppression. Because the particular ontological assumptions 
relied upon by political liberalism are, it is charged, individualism and identity 
insensitivity, the result is a theory that is conceptually unable to detect or 
address oppression that is both group- and identity-based. A seemingly innocent 
truth-avoidance yields a political theory indifferent to oppression. At each step 
along the way – at the illicit ontological assumptions and resulting epistemic 
failures – liberalism has smuggled in substantive normative truths, violating its 
own insistence on truth-avoidance. My goal in this section is threefold: first, I 
aim to explicate the charge against liberalism that it relies on an individualistic 
and identity-insensitive social ontology; second, I demonstrate how these illicit 
ontological assumptions are understood to yield epistemic blind spots 
surrounding oppression and marginalization; and third, I explain how these 
targeted arguments contribute to the broader objection that liberalism is 
disingenuous. 
Though Rawls claims that his theory of justice is political, not 
metaphysical (Rawls 1999a), communitarians, feminists, and other identity 
                                                        
6 For example, Anne Phillips comments that for some feminists, "liberalism [is] shorthand for 
everything stodgy, unambitious, and dishonest" (Phillips 2001, 249). 
7 Here I follow Charles Mills’ definition of ideology: “A set of group ideas that reflect, and 
contribute to perpetuating, illicit group privilege” (Mills 2005, 166). Thanks to Patrick Taylor 
Smith for urging me to consider the disingenuousness critique as an objection to liberalism as 
ideology. 
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theorists have charged that liberalism in fact relies on a conception of persons as 
antecedently individuated (Sandel 1998, 53), or in other words, that liberalism is 
implicitly committed to ontological atomism.8 On this view, liberal theory, 
despite protestations to the contrary, relies on a metaphysically robust 
conception of personhood according to which persons are separate from, and 
prior to, their ends (Jaggar 1983, 28; Young 1990, 44; Sandel 1998, 19). Early 
critics thus understand liberalism as “political solipsism” (Jaggar 1983, 40). More 
recently, critics have argued that liberalism “harbor[s] individualist 
metaphysical conceptions of selfhood and agency” (Alcoff 2009, 126), and that 
Rawls in particular “adopts a classically liberal abstract individualism” 
(Hirschmann 2013, 104).  
To understand the objection, recall Rawls’s hypothetical contract scenario, 
the original position, in which citizens deliberate behind a veil of ignorance. The 
veil of ignorance effectively brackets certain features of persons, since attributes 
that are morally arbitrary should not factor into our deliberations regarding the 
principles of justice. With morally arbitrary features bracketed, we are unable to 
be biased in our own favor. One problem with this line of reasoning for identity 
theorists is that the proposed methodology of bracketing supposes that people 
can set aside their identities and their conceptions of the good. Rawls’s demand 
for truth-avoidance in public reason similarly supposes that we can separate our 
identities from the truths of our comprehensive doctrines. For this methodology 
to make sense, the objection runs, Rawls must think that people exist apart from 
their traits and commitments. I must be able to set aside my personal attributes 
and still have the ‘I’ remaining. For critics, this supposition reveals Rawls’s 
substantive view of personhood (Sandel 1998, 55-56).9 Iris Marion Young, for 
example, embraces this vision of liberalism when she argues that “Liberal 
individualism denies difference by positing the self as a solid, self-sufficient unity, 
not defined by anything or anyone other than itself. Its formalistic ethic of rights 
also denies difference by bringing all such separated individuals under a 
common measure of rights” (Young 1990, 229).  
Here, Young links the charge of individualism to the charge of identity 
insensitivity (Young 1990, 229). In its most basic form, the charge of identity 
insensitivity holds that political liberalism’s method of avoidance requires laws 
to treat all citizens equally. However, the argument runs, liberals assume that 
equality requires sameness and therefore disallow any policy that would violate 
identical treatment (Hirschmann 2002, 223; MacKinnon 2005, 44; Young 2009, 
                                                        
8 Onora O’Neill raises a similar objection. She argues that the abstraction of the original 
position actually involves strategic idealization that makes it seem as though human agents 
are independent rather than interdependent, and that their desires can be understood 
accordingly (O’Neill 1989, 208-210). Unlike the critics I consider here, however, O’Neill’s 
solution is not less abstraction but rather more abstraction, or at least proper abstraction 
without idealization. 
9 See also Taylor 1992. 
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380).10 Critics charge, then, that liberalism’s focus on equality requires the 
elimination of difference, arguing that “visible difference threatens the liberal 
universalistic concepts of justice based on sameness by invoking the specter of 
difference” (Alcoff 2006, 180). Similarly, some objectors explicitly contrast 
Rawlsian liberalism with the politics of difference; liberalism is so “inhospitable 
to difference” that its main contrast is with a theory that is capable of 
recognizing and supporting diversity (Taylor 1994, 37-38); this contrast is due 
to the fact that liberalism is, and according to liberals ought to be, “blind to race, 
gender, and other group difference” (Young 2003, 231). Indeed, the critique that 
political liberalism relies upon a purposeful obliviousness to difference is one of 
the most common themes in antiliberal arguments, especially in arguments 
leveled by those who advocate for the importance of community, identity, and 
diversity. 
The effects of liberalism’s identity insensitivity, the argument continues, 
are then unevenly distributed throughout society so that members of 
marginalized social groups cannot make claims on their own behalf. Doing so 
would require an appeal to their distinct identities, and such public appeals are 
(per this critique) disallowed by liberalism (Pierik and Van der Burg 2014, 498). 
Just as Rawls’s original position is de facto biased towards individualistic 
worldviews, as the charge of ontological atomism is meant to illustrate, liberal 
policies molded by truth-avoidance are biased in favor of the majority. Since 
aspects of majority culture are taken as the neutral starting point, any claims on 
behalf of minority groups are construed as special interests requiring appeals to 
certain normative truths in politics; as such, these interests are dismissed as 
violations of Rawls’s method of avoidance.11 This is one way in which ontological 
commitments yield ideological epistemic blind spots – marginalized groups who 
need to make true political claims about their own marginalization are kept from 
doing so by a truth-avoiding political liberalism. 
According to critics, the effective silencing of marginalized social groups is 
one particular instance of political liberalism’s larger problem: because of its 
individualistic and identity- insensitive ontological commitments, and because 
oppression is inherently group- and identity- based, political liberalism is 
conceptually unable to detect oppression (Schwartzman 2006, 2013).12 As Lisa 
Schwartzman explains, “Because liberal theory grants rights to individuals as 
individuals, it primarily recognizes violations of rights that occur one at a time, to 
individuals as individuals” (Schwartzman 2006, 27.)13 Oppression, however, does 
                                                        
10 For discussion see Zerilli 2015, 367. For a defense of Rawlsian liberalism against the 
objection that its focus on ideal equality mandates a prohibition on identity-conscious policies, 
see Boettcher 2009. 
11 For a discussion of this point, see Laden 2009, 349-350. 
12 Carol Hay has an excellent discussion of this class of objections. See Hay 2013, 24. 
13 See also Schwartzman 2013, 46. Schwartzman concedes that liberalism can eventually take 
account of oppression by admitting that oppressed individuals have different opportunities, 
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not impact people as individuals; it only impacts people insofar as they are 
members of a specific social group (Cudd 2006). Critics charge that since “liberal 
individualism denies the reality of groups,” it is conceptually incapable of 
detecting systematic oppression (Young 1997, 17).14 This inability to detect 
oppression disproportionately impacts oppressed or marginalized individuals; 
thus political liberalism’s epistemic blind spots systematically harm the 
oppressed (Pierik and Van der Burg 2014, 504). 
Although objections about political liberalism’s epistemic blind spots and 
social ontology can stand on their own, my concern here is with how they 
contribute to the charge of disingenuousness. This critique maintains that 
political liberalism’s ontological problem is not just that the theory is 
individualistic and identity-insensitive; rather, it is individualistic and identity-
insensitive while claiming not to be. And political liberalism’s epistemic problem 
is not just that it has blind spots; rather, it has blind spots where it claims not to 
have any. So, for example, though Rawls maintains that he only utilizes a political 
conception of personhood (2005, 397, note 15), critics charge him with a 
voluntarist view according to which our ends are external and freely chosen; but 
because Rawls explicitly disavows a robust conception of personhood, this 
voluntarist view must be smuggled in to his theory. In turn, this view requires 
that there can be no commitment important or central enough to be constitutive 
of one’s identity (Sandel 1998, 62), and rules out ex ante any conception of the 
good that relies on such a constitutive understanding of selfhood. In short, 
although political liberalism claims to require no particular comprehensive 
doctrine, it is in fact biased in favor of comprehensive worldviews that 
understand the self as a freely choosing, abstract individual. Moreover, political 
liberalism’s truth-avoidance ostensibly requires us to tolerate our fellow 
reasonable citizens even when we strongly, perhaps vehemently, disagree with 
their views (Rawls 2005, 190); this requirement is meant to respect citizens with 
different identities. Yet critics maintain that political liberalism is in actuality 
identity-insensitive due to its abstraction away from, or bracketing of, personal 
traits. In short, although political liberalism’s method of avoidance claims to 
respect different identities, it is in fact biased in favor of the majority. This bias is 
compounded by epistemic blind spots that preclude the detection of oppression.  
At the heart of these objections is the belief that there is something 
dishonest about liberalism. Relying on a specific social ontology while claiming 
not to require any metaphysical foundation, and functioning with epistemic 
blind spots while claiming to respect as free and equal people with different 
identities, unite to allow the diagnosis that truth-avoiding political liberalism 
does not, in fact, avoid truth at all. Worse still, the reasons political liberalism 
                                                                                                                                           
for example, than non-oppressed individuals. But she argues that even though liberalism 
might ultimately acknowledge oppression, it is not a sufficient theory for discovering or 
detecting instances of oppression; on her view, radical critiques are necessary for this task. 
14 See also Pateman 1988; MacKinnon 1989. 
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touts truth-avoidance are to respect all citizens as free and equal and limit 
oppression; yet, the objection runs, its faux-truth-avoidance yields a theory that 
respects only the majority and contributes to the oppression of marginalized 
groups. In other words, according to critics, liberalism functions as yet another 
ideology.15  
5. Normative Truths in Political Liberalism 
The danger of a disingenuous political theory that functions as ideology is that it 
cannot be properly challenged. In the case of political liberalism, the charge of 
disingenuousness amounts to arguing that, while it pretends to be truth-avoiding 
or truth-neutral, the theory is in fact biased in particular ways – it is 
individualistic, identity-insensitive, and oblivious to oppression. All three biases 
favor the majority, as discussed in the previous section, yet members of 
marginalized groups are unable to object on these grounds since the theory 
claims to be bias-free. This result would render political liberalism inappropriate 
for liberatory political goals16. 
But in order for the charge of disingenuousness to stick, it must be the 
case that there is a conflict between what political liberalism claims and what it 
does. Since the objection centers around political liberalism’s truth-avoidance, to 
be guilty of disingenuousness it must be the case that the theory actually claims 
to do “without the truth, any kind of truth, at all” (Landemore 2017, 278); in 
other words, it must be the case that political liberalism endorses political non-
cognitivism. In this section, I take a closer look at Rawls’s method of avoidance in 
order to demonstrate that he does not endorse political non-cognitivism. In short, 
I argue that while Rawls does advocate truth-avoidance at the level of public 
justification, he does not avoid moral truth in his discussions of the founding 
moral norms of liberalism. These two levels, or projects – the project of 
legitimizing state action and the project of defending political liberalism – are 
not identical, though the latter does set important limits on the former;17 these 
limits are explicit and thus the charge of disingenuousness does not stick. 
                                                        
15 The two aspects of the disingenuousness critique that I consider, an illicit social ontology 
and epistemic blind sports, are two of the features that Mills attributes to ideal theory as 
ideology (2005, 168-169). The epistemic inability to detect oppression and the fact that this 
inability functions to reinforce oppression are also central features of ideology according to 
Tommie Shelby’s account of ideology critique (2003, 183-4). What I am highlighting are 
therefore what James Boettcher terms the epistemic and functional connotations of ideology 
(2009, 242). 
16 That faux neutrality about truth prevents political activism is part of MacKinnon's critique 
of liberal objectivity. For discussion, see Zuckert 2018. 
17 The two levels or projects of political liberalism map on to what Jonathan Quong calls the 
external conception of political liberalism, where the task of liberal theory is to justify 
liberalism itself, and the internal conception, where the task of liberal theory is to determine 
how to justify state action within a pluralistic liberal society (Quong 2011). My view here 
commits me to interpreting Rawls as an internalist since he does not attempt to justify the 
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Above, I noted Rawls’s argument that his political conception of justice 
“does not use (or deny) the concept of truth; nor does it question that concept, 
nor could it say that the concept of truth and its idea of the reasonable are the 
same. Rather, within itself, the political conception does without the concept of 
truth” (Rawls 2005, 94). The key part of this passage is Rawls’s insistence that 
truth-avoidance applies only to the political conception of justice within itself. In 
other words, while political liberalism does avoid the truth, it does so only at the 
level of public justification for constitutional essentials and political conceptions 
of justice within a liberal society. At this level, when citizens are debating 
amongst themselves using public reasons, the liberal principle of legitimacy 
together with the fact of reasonable pluralism does demand that they avoid 
appeals to the truth of their comprehensive doctrines for the purposes of 
justifying state action. Insofar as Rawls is engaged in this conversation when he 
defends his preferred political conception of justice, justice as fairness, he too 
must avoid appeals to the truth of his view for the purposes of justifying state 
action.18 Indeed, he is explicit that his truth-avoidance applies only to the task of 
“uncovering a public basis of justification on questions of political justice given 
the fact of reasonable pluralism” (Rawls 2005, 100). So it is only when citizens 
are proposing a specific conception of justice or debating constitutional 
essentials that political liberalism demands we avoid appeals to the truth of our 
personal comprehensive doctrines. 
Some critics have objected that even this limited domain of truth-
avoidance is enough to charge political liberalism with “a move away from moral 
objectivism and cognitivism, and at any rate moral or normative truth-claims” 
(Landemore 2017, 279).19 But this objection misses Rawls’s normative meta-
                                                                                                                                           
normative limits I discuss below, but rather stipulates them as defining features of liberalism. 
Consider, for example: “Those who reject constitutional democracy with its criterion of 
reciprocity will of course reject the very idea of public reason. For them the political relation 
may be that of friend or foe, to those of a particular religious or secular community or those 
who are not; or it may be a relentless struggle to win the world for the whole truth. Political 
liberalism does not engage those who think this way. The zeal to embody the whole truth in 
politics is incompatible with an idea of public reason that belongs with democratic citizenship” 
(Rawls 1999b, 574). In other words, Rawls’s project is not to convince illiberal citizens who 
reject the criterion of reciprocity to become liberals; if this were his project, he would embrace 
what Quong calls the externalist conception of political liberalism, and he would have to 
provide justification for the substantive moral concepts he currently stipulates. 
18 To be consistent with his own demand, Rawls notes that his view that justice as fairness is 
the most reasonable conception of justice is a “conjecture, since it may of course be incorrect” 
(Rawls 1995, 139). 
19 Though Landemore does argue that Rawls moves away from cognitivism, she does not 
object that his theory is fully non-cognitivist. Instead, she believes that Rawls substitutes his 
concept of reasonableness for the concept of truth (Landemore 2017, 280). She is here 
agreeing with Habermas, who notes that “we have reason to ask why Rawls does not think his 
theory admits of truth,” since “he here uses the predicate ‘reasonable’ in place of the predicate 
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commitments. Briefly, Rawls’s method in Political Liberalism is political 
constructivism, according to which the principles of justice are seen as the 
outcome of a deliberative procedure (Rawls 2005, 93). Rawls adds two 
additional features of political constructivism that are relevant here: first, that “it 
uses a rather complex conception of person and society to give form and 
structure to its construction,” and second, that it “specifies an idea of the 
reasonable” (Rawls 2005, 93-94).20 Both of these features involve explicitly 
moral criteria that establish normative limits on the type of society in which the 
construction of principles of justice can take place, the type of citizens who can 
engage in construction, and what count as politically acceptable reasons in the 
process of construction. 
More specifically, Rawls argues that the construction of principles of 
justice can only take place within a society understood as a fair system of social 
cooperation (Rawls 2005, 93). Citizens within this society are free and equal, and 
possess the two moral powers – a capacity for a sense of justice and for a 
conception of the good (Rawls 2005, 18-19). Rawls is clear that, though this 
conception of persons is political, it is normative (Rawls 2005, 18, note 20). Also 
normative is the concept of reasonableness, according to which citizens must 
accept the fact of reasonable pluralism, including both the burdens of judgment 
and their consequences for public reason and legitimacy, as well as the criterion 
of reciprocity. The latter requires that citizens are willing to propose fair terms 
of cooperation that could be endorsed by their fellow free and equal citizens, 
who are not dominated, manipulated, or “under pressure of an inferior political 
or social position” (Rawls 2005, xlii).21 These features of political constructivism 
are meant to establish normative truths, at the level of what I’ve called Rawls’s 
meta-commitments, that set limits on what sorts of reasons can justify political 
action at the level of public justification within a politically liberal society. It is 
because political liberalism, itself, is grounded on the normative concepts of 
fairness, equality, freedom, and respect for persons that it cannot be construed as 
non-cognitivist.22 
                                                                                                                                           
‘true’ (Habermas 1995, 122). Rawls explicitly rejects this proposition, as we’ve seen (see also 
Rawls 1995, 149-50). 
20 An additional feature is that the construction procedure is based on practical reason and not 
theoretical reason, which helps differentiate political constructivism from Kantian moral 
constructivism (Rawls 2005, 93). 
21 See also (Rawls 1999b, 578; 2005, 54). For the significance of the criterion of reciprocity for 
liberatory politics, see Hartley and Watson 2010. 
22 Importantly, Rawls does not provide a deeper moral justification for liberalism’s valuation 
of fairness, equality, or freedom; he does not provide a justification for why equality, for 
example, is a proper norm for liberal political theory, or for why reasonable citizens should 
value it. Such a justification is not necessary since his project is already addressed to 
reasonable people who by definition accept these values. This does not mean that Rawls is 
committed to the view that these moral values do not have a deeper justification, as it seems 
some critics attribute to him (Raz 1990). Rather, engaging in justification for these values 
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6. Different Games, Different Rules 
In the previous section I argued that political liberalism cannot be construed as 
non-cognitivist, since the foundations of the theory employ normative truths that 
are acknowledged to be simultaneously normative, political, and true, thus 
committing the political liberal to political cognitivism. Further, because these 
premises are explicitly built into the theory and not smuggled in as critics charge, 
political liberalism cannot be construed as disingenuous. Two related objections 
are likely to be raised at this point – one that I’ve missed the site of the 
disingenuousness critique, and the other that I’ve missed the point. In this 
section I consider the first objection and in the following section I consider the 
second. 
My argumentative strategy thus far has been to defend political liberalism 
as cognitivist by illustrating the moral truths that Rawls builds in to the 
foundations of his theory. I did so by highlighting two ways that one could 
interpret the project of political liberalism: either it is addressed to non-liberals 
as a defense of liberalism, or it is addressed to those who are already (broadly) 
liberals as a theory of how properly to justify coercive state action (Quong 2011). 
Rawls’s moral truths are built in at the first level, which serves to establish as his 
audience those who already accept key moral tenets of liberalism – that citizens 
are free and equal and accept the criterion of reciprocity, for example. Of those 
who do not accept that citizens are free and equal, Rawls simply states, “political 
liberalism does not engage with those who think this way” (Rawls 1999b, 574). 
It is only at the second level, or the level of justifying state action, that political 
liberalism eschews moral or political truth-claims.  
A proponent of the disingenuousness critique, however, might object that 
highlighting two potential projects for political liberalism as I’ve done is already 
to demonstrate the disingenuousness of the theory. It appears political liberals 
can help themselves to normative truth-claims, one might argue, while at the 
same time preventing democratic citizens from having the same access when 
debating constitutional essentials and conceptions of justice. Liberalism would 
thus be disingenuous in the sense discussed by Jean Hampton: “On the one hand, 
liberalism is committed to tolerance and thus to the state’s remaining impartial 
in its dealings with the clashing ideas of its citizens; yet on the other hand, it 
demands partiality with respect to itself, and thus insists on the use of coercion 
                                                                                                                                           
would place Rawls in conversation with other reasonable citizens who might disagree about 
the deeper grounding for fairness, equality, and freedom, and so he is constrained here by his 
truth-avoidance. Utilizing these moral values in the first place does not violate truth-avoidance 
because reasonable citizens will accept these values from within their own individual 
comprehensive doctrines; in other words, these three moral values are suitably public. For 
discussion, see Quong 2011 Chapter 8 where he explains what he calls Rawls’s “buck passing 
approach to truth.” 
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against anyone who would challenge the principle of tolerance” (Hampton 1989, 
803). 
But note that engaging in fundamentally different projects allows for the 
use of different tools. Defending liberalism and justifying the coercive actions of 
a liberal state are fundamentally different projects; they are addressed to 
different audiences, have different goals, and establish different success criteria. 
Most importantly, only one involves the coercive and potentially oppressive use 
of state power. Allowing appeals to normative truth in one project and not the 
other is no more disingenuous than allowing a wide-receiver to catch a football 
while penalizing a mid-fielder for catching a soccer ball; the wide-receiver and 
the mid-fielder are simply playing different games and must follow different 
rules.  
This different games, different rules approach is available as a political 
liberal response to critics who rest their objections on a blurring of lines 
between the two different projects. I think we can see this tendency in the 
following remarks from Helene Landemore, in which she describes the role of 
reasonableness in Rawlsian political liberalism and its associated “agnosticism 
with respect to the truth-value of moral and political claims” (Landemore 2017, 
277): 
Yet, Rawls insists that ‘the reasonable’ has nothing to do with truth… For Rawls, 
the function of ‘reasonableness’ does not require going beyond abstaining from 
criticizing comprehensive accounts of truth (including religious, philosophical 
and metaphysical). Asking himself: ‘Should we think that any of the reasonable 
doctrines present in society are true, or approximately so, even in the long run?’, 
his answer is an unambiguous, intentional, and fully assumed dodge. 
(Landemore 2017, 281) 
But there is a difference between reasonableness having “nothing to do 
with truth,” and Rawls’s resistance to categorize certain reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines as true, namely, the first assessment is about 
reasonableness as a concept, while the second is about its employment by 
democratic citizens engaged in the process of justifying coercive state action. As 
a concept, reasonableness is explicitly normative, and so it is incorrect to say 
that it has nothing to do with truth. Eliding the distinction between political 
liberalism’s two projects allows Landemore to move from claiming non-
cognitivism at the level of political justification to claiming non-cognitivism for 
political liberalism as a whole. But this move is unwarranted once the two 
projects are disambiguated.  
7. Missing the Point 
It remains the case, however, that political liberalism is truth-avoiding at the 
level of public justification. Liberal citizens are still prevented, in some sense, 
from appealing to comprehensive truth when engaging in deliberation using 
Is Liberalism Disingenuous? Truth and Lies in Political Liberalism 
127 
public reasons.23 One might object, then, that the worry of non-cognitivism still 
lingers, and that this is the level at which we should be concerned with a lack of 
truth, in the first place. In this section, I address the lingering concern. 
Recall the details of the disingenuousness objection: liberalism illicitly 
relies on an individualistic and identity-insensitive social ontology, which in turn 
yields ideological epistemic blind spots that disfavor marginalized groups. 
Members of marginalized groups are then prevented from making claims on 
their own behalf that might highlight these blind spots because political 
liberalism disingenuously claims to be bias-free. It was the clash between 
political liberalism’s apparent non-cognitivism and its illicit cognitivism that 
yielded the charge of disingenuousness. By defending political liberalism as 
cognitivist, I have addressed this objection at one level. One might think that I 
have not yet addressed the objection at the level of public justification, however, 
and it is at this level that a non-cognitivist political liberalism would yield a 
battle of personal preferences rather than allowing debates about justice.  
To employ an example used above, it is at the level of public justification 
that political liberalism would pit “Yay for affordable birth control!” against “Boo 
to affordable birth control!” as the most substantive sort of debate about 
reproductive justice permissible within the confines of its truth avoidance. From 
this point, critics could charge that liberalism’s identity-insensitive ontology 
would prevent it from detecting the structural oppression of women that is at 
issue in the denial of affordable birth control. When women claim a right to 
affordable birth control, then, political liberalism would mark this as a special-
interest claim based on the normative truth that affordable birth control is 
required by justice. As such, this claim would be disallowed from the realm of 
public reason and would not be heard as a potential justifying reason for state 
policy. The supposedly truth-neutral status quo would remain intact, and women 
would continue the struggle to control their reproductive lives. Again, the 
fulcrum of this argument is that political liberalism is formally non-cognitivist 
while illicitly cognitivist in a way that systematically favors the majority, and I 
have not yet addressed this worry. In short, one might object that I’ve thus far 
simply missed the point of the disingenuousness critique: certain claims about 
justice are true, and this in itself should be sufficient for public justification, 
regardless of what the unjust status quo presents as truth-neutral. 
This objection would have bite if political liberals were engaged in the 
project of justifying liberalism, itself, to illiberal citizens who did not endorse 
from within their own comprehensive doctrines the moral values of fairness, 
equality, freedom, and respect. But as we’ve seen, this is not the project of 
political liberalism and these moral values set normative limits on what is 
appropriate at the level of public justification. Because Rawls constrains the set 
                                                        
23 Citizens are only ‘prevented’ from violating public reason in the sense that they ought not to 
do so. They are bound by the duty of civility, which is a moral duty, and not by legislation. 
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of citizens to reasonable ones, conversations about justice are not held hostage 
by the illiberal views of those who are unreasonable. This means that there is 
nothing preventing citizens from claiming women’s right to affordable birth 
control.  
As an example, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014) perfectly illustrates a public reason argument for 
access to affordable birth control. She does so utilizing only the public moral 
values of freedom, equality, and fairness that Rawls builds into political 
liberalism, without appealing to any specific comprehensive doctrine to ground 
these values. She begins her dissent by citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pa. v. Casey (1992): “The ability of women to participate equally in the economic 
and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their 
reproductive lives” (Ginsburg 2014, 2). She notes the “disproportionate burden 
women carried for comprehensive health services and the adverse health 
consequences of excluding contraception from preventive care” (Ginsburg 2014, 
5), and on these grounds argues that the supposedly neutral status quo in 
preventive health care in fact operated to disadvantage women. Therefore, she 
concludes, the Court’s decision to exempt Hobby Lobby from the contraceptive 
mandate under the Affordable Care Act was incorrect. She comes to this 
conclusion without questioning the truth of the religious beliefs of Hobby 
Lobby’s owners, and without grounding her own argument in a competing 
comprehensive view. Rather, she appeals to the public moral values of freedom, 
equality, and fairness that act as normative limits on public deliberation in 
political liberalism.  
Note that Ginsburg is asserting as true substantive claims about justice, 
and that this is not disallowed by political liberalism. This is because the same 
moral values that keep political liberalism from non-cognitivism at the level of 
Rawls’s meta-commitments allow certain truth claims at the level of public 
justification. As long as our justificatory reasons utilize public values like 
freedom, equality, and fairness and as long as they do not appeal to the truth of 
the comprehensive doctrine that we believe grounds these values, then liberal 
citizens can make truth-apt claims about justice. This in turn means that 
marginalized citizens can speak on their own behalf about their marginalization; 
they may make truth claims which hold that their equality is systematically 
undermined, or that they do not have the effective freedom to pursue their idea 
of the good, and that both of these things are unjust. Moreover, they may believe 
the claims they are making to be true; so at the level of public justification 
political liberalism does not commit itself to non-cognitivism.24  
The force of this objection, though, is that I’ve failed to acknowledge that 
insofar as political liberalism is truth avoiding, it does not allow the truth of a 
                                                        
24 Indeed, it would be inconsistent for political liberalism to endorse non-cognitivism, since 
there are comprehensive doctrines that endorse the contrary view. See Cohen 2009, 17-18. 
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conception of justice to serve as sufficient justification for its implementation by 
the state. Indeed, Rawls does argue as I noted above that “holding a political 
conception as true, and for that reason alone the one suitable basis of public 
reason, is exclusive, even sectarian, and so likely to foster political division” 
(Rawls 2005, 129). There are two things to note in response. First, Rawls is not 
arguing that holding a political conception as true is forbidden by political 
liberalism; this would commit liberalism to requiring skepticism about citizens’ 
beliefs and values. Rather, it is the conjunction of holding a political conception 
as true and thinking that its truth renders it sufficient for justificatory purposes 
that is disallowed. This is reflective of the fact that political liberals are 
principally concerned with what sorts of reasons could legitimate coercive state 
action in a society of free and equal citizens. Citizens are allowed to believe that 
their chosen comprehensive doctrine or conception of justice is true, and they 
are allowed to make truth-apt claims that derive from these comprehensive 
doctrines in public reason; what political liberalism disallows is the assertion of 
controversial, non-public moral truths with the expectation that these truths are 
sufficient to justify coercive state action.  
Second, this is the way things should be in a society marked by reasonable 
pluralism; truth should not be sufficient to justify coercive state action. With this 
I expect many critics to disagree; critics might insist again that certain claims 
about justice are true, and moreover that preventing appeals to their truth has 
the unwelcome expressive result of insinuating that they are up for debate. 
Rawls considers this objection, but in my opinion his response unhelpfully refers 
to two different kinds of facts in a way that lends itself to criticism; because his 
response is so critical to the defense of political liberalism and truth, however, it 
deserves extended discussion and clarification. To respond to critics on this 
point, Rawls notes: “Some may ask, why look for something to ground the fact 
that slavery is unjust? What is wrong with the trivial answer: slavery is unjust 
because slavery is unjust? Can’t we stop with that?” (Rawls 2005, 123-124). 
Rawls agrees that there are features of slavery, such as that it involves the 
ownership of one person by another person, that allow us to “appeal 
straightaway” to the fact that slavery is morally wrong (Rawls 2005, 122); this is 
a basic fact that is contained within the features of slavery, itself. This is the first 
kind of fact to which Rawls refers – moral facts that are rendered true or false by 
certain rightness or wrongness-making features in the world. Political liberalism 
does not deny these moral facts. But within political liberalism, our role as 
citizens requires the offering of justificatory reasons. We must offer reasons 
based on the moral commitments of liberalism to justify that slavery is unjust, 
for example, that it violates the moral commitment that citizens are free and 
equal. This is the second kind of fact to which Rawls refers – political facts that 
are rendered true or false by the process of political constructivism. 
Separating moral and political facts in this way may make it seem as 
though moral and political facts are two distinct types in a way that fuels the 
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criticisms I’ve considered. However, Rawls’s own response on behalf of political 
liberalism relies on blurring this distinction. It is accurate that political 
liberalism requires justificatory reasons for claims that are unobjectionably 
morally true, and it is accurate that the objective standard by which to judge 
these claims differs in both cases. Moral facts, like the fact that slavery is wrong, 
are rendered true by certain wrongness-making features, while political facts, 
like the fact that slavery is unjust, are rendered true by a process of construction. 
But Rawls also notes that “there is no possibility that a principle allowing slavery 
would be agreed to. That is just a fact related to the injustice of slavery” (Rawls 
2005, 125). In other words, the moral boundaries of liberalism, itself, set 
normative limits on the process of construction. While liberal citizens, at the 
level of justifying coercive state action, must offer justificatory reasons for a 
claim that they find unobjectionably true, the truth of the claim itself is not up for 
debate. To deny that slavery is wrong would violate the moral commitments to 
freedom, equality, fairness, and respect that ground political liberalism. To refer 
to a point made earlier, asserting that something is morally wrong and asserting 
that it is politically unjust require engaging in two different games for which 
there are separate rules; in only one of these cases are we required to provide 
justificatory reasons. But this does not mean that these reasons are any less 
truth-apt than the claim that slavery is morally wrong, since the reasons we offer 
will appeal to the moral foundations of liberalism, itself. One of these 
foundations is respect for fellow citizens. It is this moral commitment that we 
uphold when we offer justificatory reasons for claims that we may believe 
require no explanation. Political liberalism’s truth avoidance is thus best 
understood as a moral restriction on what sorts of claims can justify state action. 
Truth is not enough, nor should it be. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that political liberalism is not committed to formal 
non-cognitivism in the way that some critics have charged. Because political 
liberalism never disavows the truth apt-ness of moral or political claims, the 
appearance of moral values like freedom, equality, and fairness within the theory 
itself should come as no surprise. These values make up Rawls’s meta-
commitments and are taken as the moral starting point for the political liberal 
project of justifying coercive state action in a society of free and equal citizens.  
Moreover, these normative concepts help provide answers to the complex 
charge of disingenuousness leveled by some critics of liberalism. Recall the three 
elements of this objection: first, that political liberalism assumes a robust 
ontological conception of persons while claiming not to utilize any conception of 
persons whatsoever; second, that the particularities of this assumed ontological 
conception yield epistemic blind spots that prevent liberalism from 
conceptualizing oppression, even though the theory claims to be able to do so; 
and finally, that this conflict between liberalism’s claim to non-cognitivism and 
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its illicit cognitivism make it appropriate to charge the theory with 
disingenuousness. This, in turn, makes it so that the theory cannot be properly 
challenged, since at each turn political liberals will claim to be bias-free; thus, 
critics conclude that political liberalism is simply another political ideology. 
But as my discussion of Rawls’s meta-commitments shows, it is not the 
case that political liberals claim not to utilize any conception of persons 
whatsoever. Rather, Rawls builds substantive normative values into his 
conception of persons as citizens. While this conception is political and not 
metaphysical, it is still normative and still taken to be true. And although I have 
not argued for this claim here, since citizens are taken to be free and equal 
possessors of a capacity for a sense of justice – where both equality and a sense 
of justice are partially relational concepts – Rawls's political conception of 
personhood is arguably more relational than is often acknowledged. The 
important point for our purposes here is that there is no conflict between a non-
cognitivist front and a cognitivist reality; political liberalism is cognitivist from 
its very foundation, and thus the charge of disingenuousness does not stick. 
Similarly, reasonableness is a moral notion that includes the criterion of 
reciprocity, which mandates that free and equal citizens must be able to 
participate in public deliberation not as dominated, manipulated, or “under 
pressure of an inferior political or social position” (Rawls 2005, xlii). These 
normative limits help answer the charge of epistemic blind spots surrounding 
marginalization and oppression in addition to marking political liberalism as a 
cognitivist theory. Again, the charge of disingenuousness does not stick.  
I suspect, however, that some critics may be left unsatisfied by my defense 
of political liberalism. The charge of dishonesty is extremely difficult to rebut, 
since any response could potentially be seen as an effort to obscure the ways in 
which political liberalism functions to preserve the status quo. But if this is the 
case, I wonder what political liberals could say that would nullify the charge of 
disingenuousness without being seen as merely furthering liberal ideology. If it 
is really the case that there exists no successful response on behalf of political 
liberalism, one might worry that the critical view is not open to counter-evidence, 
or indeed, that the critique is itself not truth-apt. A basic epistemic norm for 
engaging in political deliberation is that one’s beliefs must be susceptible to 
contrary evidence; if it is the case that no amount of evidence that political 
liberalism is not disingenuous would suffice to dispel the critique, then this is a 
shortcoming of the critique, not of political liberalism. Further, if it is the case 
that the critique fails to be truth-apt, then political liberals themselves can level 
the charge of non-cognitivism anew.  
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